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I. Introduction
A short sale against the box is a transaction in
which a trader holding a long position in an asset
sells the same asset short but does not immedi-
ately deliver the long position to cover the short
sale. In doing this, the trader neutralizes his or her
exposure to fluctuations in the value of the asset,
without liquidating the long position. Thus, un-
like a regular short sale, which leaves the short
seller with negative exposure to the stock, a short
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An increase in the cost
of selling short should
increase the bearish
information content
of short interest
announcements by
driving relatively
uninformed short sellers
out of the market. We
extend the Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987)
model to include short
selling against the box
and test the extended
model using a natural
experiment based around
the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 (TRA97).
TRA97 made short
selling more costly for
those shorting against
the box. Consistent with
the implications of our
extended model, this
increase in short-selling
costs strengthens the
negative relationship
between short interest
and subsequent stock
price performance
post TRA97.
e  
sale against the box leaves the trader with zero net exposure to the
stock. Short selling is more expensive than selling outright due to var-
ious restrictions on short sales, including the uptick rule, margin re-
quirements, payment of dividends, and restricted use of proceeds (see
Alexander and Peterson 1999 and D’Avolio 2002). Why would a trader
engage in this strategy rather than simply selling the asset outright to
achieve the same nonexposure? One important reason is that, prior to
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), a short sale against the box
allowed investors to eliminate their exposure to an appreciated financial
position and preserve a capital gain while postponing the capital gains
tax until a later tax year.1
TRA97 eliminated this opportunity to defer capital gains taxes by
making a short sale against the box a ‘‘constructive sale’’ upon which
capital gains or losses are immediately recognized unless some strict rules
are met (Tucker and Watson 1999).2 We formally extend the Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987) model of the informativeness of short interest to
allow for short selling against the box and use this change in the tax law as
a natural experiment to test the prediction of our model extension.
Recent empirical work suggests that short interest is a bearish indicator,
conveying negative sentiment (Figlewski and Webb 1993; Senchack and
Starks 1993; Asquith andMeulbroek 1995; Aitken et al.1998; Desai et al.
2002). Short selling contains negative information because short selling
is relatively costly and subject to more restrictions than selling shares
outright; consequently, short selling is more likely to be done by in-
formed traders (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987).3 Short selling is not
limited to informed traders, however, and to the extent that uninformed or
‘‘noise’’ traders use short selling, we expect short interest in a stock to be
a noisy signal of bearish market sentiment for that stock. The Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987) model demonstrates that an increase in the cost of
short selling increases the negative information contained in short in-
terest announcements by driving relatively uninformed short sellers out
1. Before 1950, an investor could short sell against the box and lock in a short-term capital
gain that would then be taxed at the lower long-term capital gains rate if the short position was
held long enough. The ability to convert short-term capital gains to long-term ones was
removed by the Revenue Act of 1950 (Macaulay and Durand 1951; Brent, Morse, and Stice
1990). However, until 1997, a trader who held a stock that had appreciated could lock in the
gain and immunize price risk by selling short against the box. Thus, taxes could be delayed by
holding the short position until the following tax year, at which time the long shares could be
given to the stock lender to close the short position.
2. TRA97 made several changes to the tax code, including changing the maximum capi-
tal gains tax rate from 28% to 20% on long-term gains, excluding from taxes the first $500,000
in gain from the sale of a principal residence, and exempting from taxes the gains from the sale
of small business stock (less than and $50 million in gross assets) if the proceeds are used to
purchase other small business stock. We restrict our attention to the changes requiring inves-
tors to recognize gains from short selling against the box.
3. For institutional details of short selling, see Asquith and Meulbroek (1995), Angel
(1997), Dechow et al. (2001), and D’Avolio (2002).
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of the market at a higher rate than relatively informed short sellers.
TRA97 provides an exogenous change in short selling costs, which we
use to test this theory.4
Using a large sample of short interest announcements, we document
the determinants of short interest and demonstrate that, prior to TRA97,
short selling against the box was a popular trading strategy. TRA97 elim-
inated the tax benefits of short selling against the box, thereby making
this trading strategy more costly. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict
that an increase in the costs of short selling should increase the infor-
mation content of short interest announcements; our findings provide
strong evidence in support of this view. One of the strengths of our paper
over previous studies of the informativeness of short-interest announce-
ments lies in the generality of our results. By exploiting an exogenous
event as a natural experiment, we are able to demonstrate that the costs of
short selling increase the negative information content of short interest
announcements in general, rather than for just a subset of stocks, such as
those that have very high levels of short interest (Asquith andMeulbroek
1995; Desai et al. 2002), traded options (Senchack and Starks 1993), or
have an introduction of traded options (Danielson and Sorescu 2001).
Particularly for NYSE stocks, short-interest announcements after
TRA97 convey significantly more negative sentiment than those before
TRA97. In contrast to the findings of Asquith and Meulbroek (1995)
and Desai et al. (2002), it is no longer true that the negative relationship
between short interest and subsequent stock price performance holds
only in the most heavily shorted stocks. Rather, we find that, after TRA97,
short-interest announcements convey negative information even for stocks
with moderate levels of short interest.
Announcements of high levels of short interest convey negative in-
formation for NASDAQ stocks both before and after TRA97. In contrast
to the predictions of Diamond and Verrecchia, however, and in direct
contrast to our findings for NYSE stocks, the highest levels of short
interest in NASDAQ stocks have less negative information content after
TRA97. One possible reason for this stems from an important institu-
tional difference between the two markets—reforms to the NASDAQ
market enacted during 1997 substantially decreased trading costs for
4. Because short selling is more costly than selling outright, we posit that short selling
against the box is primarily a tax-motivated strategy rather than an information-motivated
strategy. It is possible, however, that informed traders could use short selling against the box to
hide information-based trades among those of the uninformed or that informed traders have
both tax- and information-motivated reasons to eliminate downside risk in a stock. We pos-
tulate that the proportion of informed traders using short sales against the box is substantially
smaller than the proportion of informed traders in the general short-selling population. After
TRA97, the extra tax costs of short selling against the box make it more likely that, when a
short sale occurs, it is a result of relatively informed traders with negative expectations, rather
than due to tax motivations. We model this formally in Section III as an extension of Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987).
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#large and mid-cap NASDAQ stocks (see Weston 2000). We speculate
that this reduction in trading costs brought in uninformed traders in our
high short-interest stocks, thereby muting the noise-reducing effect of
TRA97.
We use analytical results from Dyl (1978) to establish the prevalence
of short selling against the box prior to TRA97, then we provide a direct
test of our extension of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). Our paper is
most closely related to the empirical work of Asquith and Meulbroek
(1995) and Senchack and Starks (1993). Asquith and Meulbroek (1995)
and Desai et al. (2002) demonstrate the negative relationship between
high levels of short interest and subsequent stock returns. We demon-
strate similar results, although we find that, following TRA97, the neg-
ative relation extends well beyond the highest short-interest stocks and to
stocks with and without options.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes literature on the costs and determinants of short selling. Section III
presents our extension to the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model. Sec-
tion IV discusses our empirical hypothesis. Section V describes our data,
empirical methods, and results. Section VI presents our main result—that
short interest is more informative after TRA97. Section VII concludes.
II. Costs and Determinants of Short Selling
The typical stock has very little short interest; most stocks have less than
0.5% of their shares outstanding held short. Thus, while there is sub-
stantial cross-sectional variation in short-interest levels, based in part on
the determinants discussed in this section, the reader should bear in mind
that short selling represents only a small proportion of total transactions
in the average stock.
The pre-TRA97 determinants of tax-motivated short sales are de-
scribed in Dyl (1978).5 An investor who wishes to realize a capital gain
must choose between selling the position outright and selling short
against the box. By selling outright, the investor receives the proceeds
from the sale immediately but incurs capital gains taxes in the current
year. By selling short against the box, the investor defers the receipt of the
proceeds because they are held as collateral against the short position by
the broker. The investor also defers the capital gains taxes until a sub-
sequent tax year. Thus, the after-tax net present value from selling out-
right is, using Dyl’s notation, P  TðP  CÞ, where P is the current price
of the stock, T is the applicable tax rate, and C is the cost basis for the in-
vestor’s holdings. The after-tax net present value of selling short against
the box is P=ð1þ iÞy  TðP  CÞ=ð1þ iÞ12, where i is the monthly
5. This paragraph draws heavily upon Dyl (1978). We simplify the presentation of his
model by assuming tax rates do not change.
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#opportunity cost of funds and y is the number of months after the short
sale that the short position is covered. The relevant opportunity cost of
funds is the monthly cost of borrowing the stock to short (see Reed 2002
for a comprehensive discussion of stock lending rates). The proceeds (P)
are discounted until the short position is covered; the tax liability is
discounted a full 12 months, because deferring the recognition of the tax
defers payment for a full year: for instance, taxes on capital gains in 1995
are paid on or about April 15, 1996; deferring recognition of those gains
to the 1996 tax year means they are paid on or about April 15, 1997.6 The
tax-savvy investor thus trades off the two net present values described
previously when deciding whether to sell outright or sell short against
the box. Key comparative statics results that obtain are that lower tax
rates (T ), longer required holding periods for the short position ( y), and
smaller capital gains (P  C ) all reduce the relative profitability of
selling short against the box, ceteris paribus. We draw upon these two
latter results in Sections IVandV. In those sections, we argue, first, that a
minimum cost strategy is likely to involve shorting as late as possible in
the tax year and covering as soon as possible in the new tax year and,
second, that the higher is the cumulative stock return, the more likely is
a short sale.
Jones and Lamont (2002) argue that using short interest as a proxy for
shorting demand is problematic because the costs of short selling, rather
than the realized amount of short selling, should be related to future stock
performance. For example, in a stock where the cost of shorting is pro-
hibitively high, there is likely to be little or no short interest, yet stock
prices are likely to be optimistic (as inMiller 1977) and subsequent stock
performance is likely to be poor. Thus, to properly test the relation be-
tween short interest and future returns, it is important to look at the
marginal impact of changes in the cost of short selling on future returns;
this is exactly what we do.7
To attribute changes in short-selling behavior to the changes in short-
selling costs brought about by TRA97, however, we need to control
for non-information-based determinants of short selling. Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987) argue that introducing option contracts on a stock re-
duces the costs associated with short selling, because option strategies
6. To put the effect of TRA97 into the context of the model, the tax liabilities are now
discounted for 0 months instead of 12 (because a short sale against the box is treated as a
‘‘constructive sale’’), which means that there are no net benefits to selling short against the box
after TRA97.
7. Although the use of short interest as a determinant of future stock return cannot escape
this criticism, short interest data are much more readily available than explicit shorting costs,
however; and ignoring the few hot stocks that are prohibitively costly to short, our use of
short interest is justified. Indeed, D’Avolio (2002, p. 273) notes that 91% of stocks in his U.S.
sample are cheap to borrow (the so-called general collateral stocks), 8% of his sample are lent
out at more expensive ‘‘special’’ rates, and the final 1% comprise hot stocks with very high
loan rates.
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#allow traders to mimic short-selling strategies.8 Figlewski and Webb
(1993) and Senchack and Starks (1993) present empirical evidence that
optionable stocks display more informational efficiency than nonoption-
able stocks. Brent et al. (1990), Aitken et al. (1998), andGraham, Hughen,
and McDonald (1999) all use dummy variables to control for whether a
stock is optionable or not. They argue that the use of options is associated
with the use of short selling for hedging and options arbitrage purposes,
which must be controlled for when looking at information-based reasons
for short selling.
Graham et al. (1999) include the bid-ask spread as a proxy for trading
costs, asserting that traders are more likely to short sell stocks for which
the trading costs are lower.We use average trading volume as an alternate
proxy for trading costs—higher volume stocks are more liquid, thus it is
less costly to open and close short positions. We do not expect bid-ask
spreads to systematically affect our results. In fact, due to reductions in
minimum price variation, effective bid-ask spreads have decreased on
average over our sample period (see Goldstein and Kavajecz 2000 and
Bessembinder 2000), biasing against our finding that the informativeness
of short-interest announcements has increased post TRA97.
Dechow et al. (2001) argue that dividend yields and institutional
ownership are proxies for trading costs, because dividends must be paid
by the investor who holds the short position and higher institutional
ownership reflects a larger pool of shares that can be borrowed. They also
control for market capitalization, because it is easier to borrow a large-
capitalization stock. Average dividend yields have decreased during our
sample period, making short selling less costly in general. We control for
such systematic determinants of short interest by including aggregate
short interest in our regressions (see later).
According to Sias and Starks (1997), capitalization and institutional
ownership are highly correlated. To the extent that large capitalization
companies have a large number of shares held by institutional investors,
we can indirectly control for the institutional ownership by including
market capitalization in our regressions (see later). Dechow et al. (2001)
state that short sellers target firms with prices that are temporarily high
relative to fundamentals and in which it is expected that prices, not
fundamentals, will revert. According to our hypotheses, trades enacted
under these trading strategies have more impact after TRA97.
Brent et al. (1990) and Graham et al. (1999) also include dummies for
whether a company has convertible debt or not. Because convertible
debt has an imbedded warrant on the underlying stock, convertible bond
8. Note, however, that Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) state that discussions with short
sellers reveal that they do not consider options trades as an alternative to short selling because
the costs of option trading are too high (p. 6). Miller (1977, p. 1161) makes a similar point
regarding the high costs of option trading.
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#holders (or bond arbitrageurs) may wish to hold short positions in the
stock to offset the imbedded warrant. Brent et al. (1990) also argue that
investors are more likely to short against the box if the stock is volatile.
However, they find no statistical evidence of a relationship between the
stock beta and short interest or between the market-model residual var-
iance and short interest.
Recent studies document that short selling is also related to merger
activity (Mitchell and Pulvino 2001; Cornelli and Li 2002; Mitchell,
Pulvino, and Stafford 2003). Risk arbitrageurs attempt to profit from
the spread between the target stock price and the offer price. In a stock
merger, arbitrageurs lock in the spread by taking a long position in the
target stock and selling short the acquirer’s stock. Indeed, Mitchell et al.
(2003) claim that almost half of the fall in stock price experienced by
acquirers during stock-financed merger announcement periods is due to
price pressure from short sellers engaged in merger arbitrage.
Of the above-mentioned determinants of short interest, we directly
control for volume, options, market value, convertible securities, and
merger arbitrage. We also control for other variables not yet mentioned,
as explained in Section V. Our findings are consistent with prior studies:
the existence of options on a stock or convertible securities is a major
determinant of short interest. Similarly, trading volume and merger ac-
tivity are strongly related to short-selling activity.
III. Extension of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)
The Diamond and Verrecchia model excludes the possibility that
investors who hold shares longmaywant to sell short. In their model, this
is reasonable because selling short is costly relative to selling outright,
and there are no tax motivations to trade in their model.We offer a simple
extension of their model, where some investors may want to sell short
against the box, that is, sell short an asset they also hold long, as opposed
to selling the asset outright. We first list our notation in tables 1 and 2.
To facilitate comparison to the Diamond andVerrecchia model, we use
their notation and model setup throughout. Figure 1 replicates the game
tree from Diamond and Verrecchia (their figure 1). Figure 2 adds our
extension to the Diamond and Verrecchia model. The salient difference
between our extension and the Diamond and Verrecchia model is that a
trader who holds shares long might sell the shares or short sell the shares
(while maintaining the long position); we explicitly allow short selling
against the box in our extension, but Diamond and Verrecchia abstract
from tax-motivated reasons to short sell. We denote the probability of a
tax benefit to short selling against the box (conditional upon the trader
wanting to sell or short sell and holding shares long) as q.
As in Diamond and Verrecchia, we allow three costs of short selling:
no cost (or, without loss of generality, minimal or trivial cost), restrictive
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#costs of short selling (modeled by Diamond and Verrecchia as deferred
receipt of proceeds, but without loss of generality, this can be any nonpro-
hibitive cost of short selling), and prohibitive costs. Following Diamond
and Verrecchia, we denote the fraction of traders facing these costs as C1,
C2, andC3, respectively, andC1 þ C2 þ C3 ¼ 1. These costs are such that
informed traders with bad news find it profitable to sell short if they are of
types 1 or 2 but not of type 3; uninformed traders with liquidity motivated
reasons to sell will sell short only if they are type-1 traders.
When there are tax-deferring advantages to short selling against the
box, some traders may prefer selling short against the box to selling
outright if the tax deferring benefit exceeds the costs of selling short. We
assume both informed and uninformed traders face the same tax benefits
and denote the proportion of traders with a tax benefit to selling short
against the box as q and those choosing to sell outright as 1 q (both
conditional upon holding shares). Now, the tax benefits from a short sale
against the box can exceed the costs of the short sale for some traders (i.e.,
those C1 and C2 traders in group q), inducing some traders to sell short
against the box because of the tax effects. If the benefits from a short sale
against the box do not exceed the costs of the short sale (i.e., for those C3
traders in group q), traders sell outright rather than sell short against the
TABLE 1 Notation
Variable Definition
v Value of the asset, either 1 or 0.
g Probability that one trader wants to trade (for liquidity- or
information-based motives).
a Probability that a given trader is informed (the fraction of traders
who are informed).
h Probability that a trader already owns the stock (the fraction
of traders who hold long positions).
Ci Probability that a trader faces cost i of short selling (the fraction
of traders facing cost i ). C1 denotes no costs to sell short, C2
denotes modest costs to sell short, C3 denotes prohibitive costs
to sell short; C1 þ C2 þ C3 ¼ 1.
q Probability that a trader who holds shares will have tax benefits
from selling short against the box.
TABLE 2 Types of Traders and How They Trade
Cost Type
Informed with Bad
News and No
Long Position
Uninformed with
Preference to Sell
and No Long Position
Informed with
Bad News and
Holds Shares
Uninformed with
Preference to Sell
and Holds Shares
C1: No cost Short Short Sell or SSAB Sell or SSAB
C2: Restrictive
costs Short No trade Sell or SSAB Sell or SSAB
C3: Prohibitive
costs No trade No trade Sell Sell
Note.—Short selling against the box is denoted SSAB.
1314 Journal of Business
#Fig. 2.—Extension of Diamond andVerrecchia (1987). This figure presents the tree
diagram of the extended version of the model from Diamond and Verrecchia (1987),
where short selling against the box (denoted SSAB in the figure) is possible.
Fig. 1.—The Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model. This figure replicates the
tree diagram of the model from Diamond and Verrecchia (1987, fig. 1) and so
does not allow for short selling against the box.
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#box (see the summary in table 2). Note that, if q is zero, indicating that no
investors enjoy a tax benefit to selling short against the box, our extension
collapses to the original Diamond and Verrecchia model (figure 1).
We use this simple extension to examine the effects of eliminating
short selling against the box, such as with the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997. Specifically, we derive two key theoretical results (derived and
proved in the appendix).
Proposition 1 (Reduction of Short Selling against the Box). As
the probability of tax benefits to short selling against the box, q, de-
creases, the proportion of informed short selling increases.
Corollary to Proposition 1 (Elimination of Short Selling against
theBox). If q is zero, the proportion ofinformed short selling is greater
than if q were strictly positive.
Taken together, these two results provide an important empirical
prediction: if markets or regulations change in such a way that the pro-
portion of traders wanting to sell short against the box decreases, the
proportion of short sellers who are informed traders increases. This, in
turn, increases the negative information content in short-interest announce-
ments. We test this prediction in Section VI.
IV. Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that the information content of short interest increases
after TRA97 due to the departure from the market of (relatively unin-
formed) tax-motivated traders selling short against the box. This hy-
pothesis stems directly from our extension of Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987). Before testing our hypothesis, we first confirm that there was a
change in short selling against the box after the implementation of TRA97.
Having done that, we then compare the information content of short in-
terest before and after TRA97.
Our data identify short interest in individual stocks, but short sales
against the box are not directly identifiable as such. We identify short
selling against the box indirectly by postulating a ‘‘minimum-cost strat-
egy’’ that pre-TRA97 tax-motivated traders selling short against the box
would likely use, based on Dyl (1978). The logical strategy to defer taxes
and minimize trading costs prior to TRA97 is to sell an appreciated stock
short against the box before or during December and close the position
in the following January. A taxpayer following this strategy could have
locked in gains on the appreciated stock, postponed paying capital gains
taxes until the following tax season, and maintained the costly short po-
sition for as short a time as possible—a minimum-cost strategy.9 Traders
9. This is precisely the strategy advocated by Dyl’s (1978) deterministic model of when
an investor should sell short against the box instead of sell the stock outright—investors
want to minimize y, the length of time the short position is open, ceteris paribus.
1316 Journal of Business
 
#could implement or close short sales against the box positions at other
times of the year.10 Short selling is costly, however, so we expect rational
investors to maintain short positions for the shortest time period possible,
ceteris paribus. If taxpayers followed this minimum-cost strategy prior to
TRA97, then we should see abnormally large short interest in December
as investors implement their tax-deferring strategies and substantially
smaller short interest in January as investors close their tax-deferring
positions. Examination of how this phenomenon changed after the im-
plementation of TRA97 gives a conservative estimate of the effect of
TRA97 upon levels of short selling against the box.
In Section V, we identify trading patterns consistent with short selling
against the box. In Section VI, we test our main hypothesis, that the
negative information contained in short interest announcements in-
creased after TRA97.
V. Data, Methods, and Results
A. Sample Description
Short-interest data from January 1995 throughNovember 1999 come from
the NYSE and from the NASDAQ Web site.11 NYSE and NASDAQ
short-interest data are compiled monthly, based on short positions held
as of settlement on the 15th of each month; the data are made publicly
available several days later (4 business days later for NYSE, 8 business
days later for NASDAQ). Because we examine short interest in Decem-
ber and January to infer levels of short selling against the box, one po-
tential concern is that any short positions implemented after the 15th of a
given month and closed prior to the 15th of the following month do not
appear in our data; this ‘‘invisible’’ short selling biases against our finding
significant results.
In a typical month, well over 5,000 NASDAQ and 3,000 NYSE stocks
and other securities are reported with short interest.12 Most prior studies
of short interest examine samples of 200 or fewer stocks or they examine
stockswith unusually high levels of short interest. The latter increases the
power of their tests but allows researchers to draw few conclusions about
stocks with more typical levels of short interest. We examine a much
larger sample, allowing us to make broader, more general inferences.
We include in our study those common stocks that have reported
short interest (including zero short interest) for each month during our
10. If a trader opened a short sale against the box position prior to December to defer
realization of capital gains taxes, he or she would need to hold the position through the end
of the tax period and so would still hold the short position in December, regardless of when
the short position was opened.
11. See www.marketdata.NASDAQ.com for NASDAQ data details.
12. These include common stock, preferred stock, and warrants. Approximately 75% are
common stock.
1317The Information Content of Short Interest: A Natural Experiment
#sample period, resulting in a sample of 1,129 NASDAQ stocks and 535
NYSE stocks for which we have price and return information from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).13 This increases
the power of our tests without being as restrictive as Asquith and
Meulbroek (1995), for example, who primarily examine only heavily
shorted stocks. To mitigate any confounding effects of TRA97 being
implemented midmonth (June 8, 1997), we exclude June 1997 obser-
vations from our sample. Descriptive statistics for our sample are in
tables 3, 4, and 5.
Table 3 describes for our NYSE data the distribution of aggregate short
interest for our sample, short interest as a percentage of total shares out-
standing (i.e., relative short interest), index and security returns, trading
volume, the presence of options and convertible securities, market value
of equity for our sample stocks, and a dummy for whether the firm is in
the process of acquiring another. We report descriptive statistics for these
variables for the full sample and stratify by how much relative short
interest each stock has. We segregate our sample into quintiles of relative
short interest, with Quintile 1 having the least relative short interest, and
Quintile 5 the highest relative short interest. Table 4 presents analogous
information for our NASDAQ data.
Table 5 presents correlations among our variables. Our measures of
short interest are strongly correlated with firm size, trading volume, the
presence of options or convertible securities, and merger activity.
Figure 3 shows time trends of short interest for the top three relative
short-interest quintiles for each exchange. The average relative short
interest of each NASDAQ quintile is higher than the average relative
short interest of the corresponding NYSE quintile for every month in
our sample. The graph shows a fairly consistently upward trend in short
interest from 1995 through 1998; relative short interest drops during
1999 for each quintile of short interest. The peak corresponds roughly
with the month immediately prior to the collapse of the infamous hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management (in late September 1998).
B. Determinants of Short Interest and Short Selling against the Box
We perform two sets of regressions. In the first set of regressions, we
identify the determinants of short interest over the sample period and
assess the extent of short selling against the box. In the second set of
regressions, we examine the information content of short interest over the
sample period (see Section VI). By examining the differences between
the regression coefficients in the regressions, we can determine the
effects of TRA97.
13. We exclude all those securities that are not common stocks, which eliminates about
25% of the original sample, and those are not listed in CRSP, which eliminates about 30% of
the original sample. Our requirement of a full, balanced panel of data is the most restrictive
of our screens and brings us to our final sample size of 1,664 stocks.
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TABLE 3 NYSE Descriptive Statistics
Size Volume
Stock
Return
Market
Return Option
Relative Short
Interest
Log Natural
(Size) Convertibles
Risk
Arbitrage
Aggregate Short
Interest
Full sample Mean 3,960,113 256,563 1.16% 1.98% .4935 .013425 13.2637 .1300 .0286 659.72
Median 431,818 50,552 .81% 2.43% .0000 .003980 12.9758 .0000 .0000 718.85
SD 13,765,537 656,417 10.20% 4.55% .5000 .030314 1.8305 .3363 .1667 183.68
Least relative short Mean 397,357 33,683 1.29% 1.98% .1018 .000136 12.0240 .0649 .0069
interest quintile Median 152,430 15,402 .77% 2.43% .0000 .000089 11.9345 .0000 .0000
(Quintile 1) SD 1,287,848 61,042 9.17% 4.55% .3025 .000143 1.1224 .2464 .0830
Quintile 2 Mean 767,477 53,028 .86% 1.98% .2054 .001060 12.3901 .0799 .0056
Median 213,023 22,759 .67% 2.43% .0000 .000939 12.2692 .0000 .0000
SD 3,756,971 165,631 9.00% 4.55% .4041 .000574 1.1983 .2712 .0749
Quintile 3 Mean 6,702,354 304,139 1.12% 1.98% .5390 .004166 13.5883 .1076 .0150
Median 576,690 53,406 .82% 2.43% 1.0000 .003980 13.2651 .0000 .0000
SD 19,536,904 810,761 9.66% 4.55% .4985 .001683 1.9884 .3099 .1215
Quintile 4 Mean 8,113,917 447,355 1.47% 1.98% .7955 .011157 14.3866 .1481 .0358
Median 1,726,825 165,917 1.24% 2.43% 1.0000 .010495 14.3618 .0000 .0000
SD 19,979,081 851,674 10.40% 4.55% .4034 .003680 1.8315 .3552 .1857
Most relative short Mean 3,819,457 444,610 1.08% 1.98% .8255 .050604 13.9296 .2493 .0798
interest quintile Median 1,168,485 206,876 .66% 2.43% 1.0000 .033009 13.9712 .0000 .0000
(Quintile 5) SD 10,161,538 758,748 12.39% 4.55% .3796 .052684 1.6250 .4326 .2709
Note.—This table presents descriptive statistics of sample data. Data are for the full sample of 535 NYSE stocks during the period January 1995 through November 1999.
Descriptive statistics are reported for firm size (in thousands of dollars), volume (the average daily volume over the previous month), monthly stock return, CRSP value-weighted
index return, dummy variable for options (1 = traded options on the stock, 0 otherwise), relative short interest (total number of shares held short divided by total number of shares
outstanding), natural log of firm size, dummy variable for convertibles (1 = convertible securities in the firm’s capital structure, 0 otherwise), dummy variable for risk arbitrage (1 =
firm has announced an acquisition of another publicly traded firm; changes to 0 when the target delists; 0 otherwise), and the aggregate short interest for our sample firms in a given
month (in millions of shares).
1
3
1
9
T
h
e
In
fo
rm
a
tio
n
C
o
n
ten
t
o
f
S
h
o
rt
In
terest:
A
N
a
tu
ra
l
E
x
p
erim
en
t
This content downloaded from 141.166.177.122 on Thu, 24 Jul 2014 11:16:23 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TABLE 4 NASDAQ Descriptive Statistics
Size Volume
Stock
Return
Market
Return Option
Relative Short
Interest
Log Natural
(Size) Convertibles
Risk
Arbitrage
Aggregate Short
Interest
Full sample Mean 900,439 242,424 2.15% 1.98% .4460 .017029 11.9079 .1157 .0132 629.39
Median 133,400 50,946 .04% 2.43% .0000 .004730 11.8011 .0000 .0000 665.10
SD 9,200,211 1,061,939 18.56% 4.55% .4971 .032383 1.5087 .3198 .1142 218.43
Least relative short Mean 130,269 30,435 2.49% 1.98% .1211 .000228 11.1099 .0925 .0050
interest quintile Median 66,884 14,729 .59% 2.43% .0000 .000185 11.1107 .0000 .0000
(Quintile 1) SD 214,153 66,010 16.54% 4.55% .3263 .000192 1.1522 .2897 .0708
Quintile 2 Mean 219,384 57,595 2.46% 1.98% .2731 .001489 11.3765 .0797 .0051
Median 85,399 29,152 .06% 2.43% .0000 .001334 11.3551 .0000 .0000
SD 3,799,257 221,370 18.39% 4.55% .4456 .000729 1.2206 .2709 .0713
Quintile 3 Mean 935,746 143,810 2.05% 1.98% .4513 .005076 11.8893 .0935 .0095
Median 133,924 52,021 .09% 2.43% .0000 .004751 11.8050 .0000 .0000
SD 14,080,371 923,293 17.96% 4.55% .4976 .001995 1.3895 .2912 .0972
Quintile 4 Mean 2,220,055 454,313 1.92% 1.98% .6322 .014508 12.4637 .1015 .0209
Median 218,577 103,150 .03% 2.43% 1.0000 .013541 12.2949 .0000 .0000
SD 14,036,965 1,796,285 18.90% 4.55% .4822 .005326 1.6481 .3021 .1429
Most relative short Mean 996,740 525,967 1.82% 1.98% .7524 .063844 12.7001 .2112 .0256
interest quintile Median 312,512 210,637 .00% 2.43% 1.0000 .045961 12.6524 .0000 .0000
(Quintile 5) SD 3,265,377 1,136,799 20.75% 4.55% .4317 .048435 1.4356 .4082 .1580
Note.—This table presents descriptive statistics of sample data. Data are for the full sample of 1,129 NASDAQ stocks during the period January 1995 through November 1999.
Descriptive statistics are reported for firm size (in thousands of dollars), volume (the average daily volume over the previous month), monthly stock return, CRSP value-weighted
index return, dummy variable for options (1 = traded options on the stock, 0 otherwise), relative short interest (total number of shares held short divided by total number of shares
outstanding), natural log of firm size, dummy variable for convertibles (1 = convertible securities in the firm’s capital structure, 0 otherwise), dummy variable for risk arbitrage (1 =
firm has announced an acquisition of another publicly traded firm; changes to 0 when the target delists; 0 otherwise), and the aggregate short interest for our sample firms in a given
month (in millions of shares).
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TABLE 5 Correlations among Variables
Size
Natural
Log
(Size) Volume
Natural
Log
(Volume)
Short
Interest
Natural Log
(Short Interest)
Relative
Short
Interest
Agg. Short
Interest, Both
Exchanges
Stock
Return
Market
Return Option Convertibles
Risk
Arbitrage
Size 1.0000 .4410 .6820 .3206 .6143 .2400 .0003 .0624 .0146 .0003 .1696 .0013 .1254
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .9321 .0001 .0001 .9323 .0001 .6792 .0001
Natural log
(size) .4401 1.0000 .4143 .6385 .4778 .6052 .1647 .0838 .0464 .0027 .5889 .0124 .1552
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .3974 .0001 .0001 .0001
Volume .6820 .4143 1.0000 .4730 .6732 .3154 .1280 .0758 .0276 .0003 .2256 .0315 .1067
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .9196 .0001 .0001 .0001
Natural log
(volume) .3206 .6385 .4730 1.0000 .4724 .7230 .3580 .0968 .0795 .0099 .6204 .1041 .1142
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0022 .0001 .0001 .0001
Short interest .6143 .4778 .6732 .4724 1.0000 .4264 .3510 .0903 .0069 .0081 .2793 .0767 .1964
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0315 .0118 .0001 .0001 .0001
Natural log
(Short
Interest) .2400 .6052 .3154 .7230 .4264 1.0000 .4959 .1150 .0289 .0163 .5747 .1236 .1287
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
Relative short
.0003 .1647 .1280 .3580 .3510 .4959 1.0000 .0493 .0068 .0075 .2878 .1747 .0743interest
.9321 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0346 .0205 .0001 .0001 .0001
Agg. short
interest, both
exchanges .0624 .0838 .0758 .0968 .0903 .1150 .0493 1.0000 .0567 .0872 .0000 .0598 .0344
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 1.0000 .0001 .0001
Stock return .0146 .0464 .0276 .0795 .0069 .0289 .0068 .0567 1.0000 .2989 .0305 .0035 .0082
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0315 .0001 .0346 .0001 .0001 .0001 .2818 .0108
Market return .0003 .0027 .0003 .0099 .0081 .0163 .0075 .0872 .2989 1.0000 .0001 .0052 .0114
.9323 .3974 .9196 .0022 .0118 .0001 .0205 .0001 .0001 .9781 .1036 .0004
Option .1696 .5889 .2256 .6204 .2793 .5747 .2878 .0000 .0305 .0001 1.0000 .0855 .0779
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 1.0000 .0001 .9781 .0001 .0001
Convertibles .0013 .0124 .0315 .1041 .0767 .1236 .1747 .0598 .0035 .0052 .0855 1.0000 .0159
.6792 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .2818 .1036 .0001 .0001
Risk arbitrage .1254 .1552 .1067 .1142 .1964 .1287 .0743 .0344 .0082 .0114 .0779 .0159 1.0000
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .1008 .0004 .0001 .0001
Note.—This table reports correlations among variables of interest and the p-value for a two-sided hypothesis test that each correlation is different from zero (reported below each
correlation). Data are monthly observations for 535 NYSE stocks and 1,129 NASDAQ stocks during the period January 1995 through November 1999.
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#We examine the determinants of short selling andwhether short selling
against the box was prevalent prior to TRA97, using relative short in-
terest as our dependent variable.14 We employ several independent
variables in our regression analysis. The larger is the stock price appre-
ciation in the tax year to date, the larger the incentive to postpone taxes by
shorting against the box; we therefore include the stock return from
January 1 to the 15th of the current month (corresponding with the
settlement date for short interest reported by both NYSE and NASDAQ).
Short selling is likely to be more attractive when traders are able to cover
their short position easily. Thus, stocks with high trading volume are
more liquid and more likely to be sold short, ceteris paribus. Therefore,
we include in our regressions the natural log of average daily volume
from the 15th of the previous month to the 15th of the current month.
A strong correlation is found between firm size and institutional
ownership (see Sias and Starks 1997). As such, stocks with larger market
capitalization are likely to have a relatively high availability of shares to
be sold short. We control for the availability of shares by including the
14. The regression results we obtain are qualitatively similar when we use alternate
measures of short selling such as total short interest, natural log of short interest, natural log of
relative short interest, and short interest divided by average daily trading volume (not reported).
Statistical tests (see Hsiao 1986, pp. 12–15) indicate that our cross-sectional time series data
can be treated as pooled data. Consequently, all our regressions are pooled ordinary least
squares regressions, with appropriate robust standard errors as discussed in the table captions.
Fig. 3.—Evolution of aggregate NYSE and NASDAQ short interest. This figure
shows the time series of relative short interest for our sample. Shown is the
average short interest divided by shares outstanding (relative short interest) for
the top three quintiles of relative short interest for both the NYSE and NASDAQ
stocks in our sample.
1322 Journal of Business
#market value of the firm in our regressions. Market value is calculated as
the natural logarithm of the product of the stock price at the market close
on the 15th of the month and the shares outstanding as of the 15th of the
month.
Shares may be sold short to hedge option positions in the stock. To
control for options arbitrage and hedging-motivated short interest, we
construct a dummy variable to indicate whether the stock has traded
options. We find information on which stocks have traded options from
Options Clearing Corporation. The option dummy variable takes a value
of 1 if a stock has traded options (264 of 535 NYSE securities, 504 of
1,129 NASDAQ securities), and 0 otherwise. In addition to options ar-
bitrage and hedging effects on short interest, the option market may
provide a substitute for short selling through synthetic construction of
short positions (see note 7 though). We also control for the possibility of
arbitrage-motivated short selling in conjunctionwith the presence of con-
vertible debt or convertible preferred stock. Research Insight (Compustat)
provides data on the firms in our sample that have convertible securities.
We construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a company has
convertible securities in a given month and 0 otherwise. Because the data
are reported on an annual basis, we may lose some power in our tests.
Nonetheless, we find strong statistical significance in the direction that
we expect.
To capture the effect of shorting due to merger-related risk arbitrage,
we include a dummy variable in our regression to control for merger
arbitrage activity. The dummy variable is set to 1 for any firm that an-
nounces an acquisition and remains 1 until the acquisition is completed
and the target delists.15 Our merger data correspond to acquisition an-
nouncements that involve stock as part of the compensation. Both the
acquirer and the target must be publicly traded. Within our data, we find
187 NYSE acquisitions (92 using a fixed stock ratio and 95 a floating
stock ratio), comprising 86 different firms. The average time to completion
is 6.2months.We find 185NASDAQacquisitions (124 using a fixed stock
ratio and 61 a floating stock ratio), comprising 121 different firms. The
average time to completion is 6.0 months. Six of the NASDAQ acqui-
sitions and 13 of the NYSE acquisitions subsequently fell through; we
treated these as 6-month deals so that we do not lose the data points. Our
results are not sensitive to excluding the 19 mergers that fell through.
Movements of the overall market may affect traders’ ability or desire
to sell stocks short. To control for this, we include in our regression
analysis the return on the CRSP value-weighted index calculated be-
tween the 15th of the previous month and the 15th of the current month.
Similarly, we include a measure of aggregate ‘‘market’’ short interest to
15. These data were kindly provided by Todd Pulvino. See Mitchell et al. (2003) for
details on data collection.
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#capture systematic changes and trends in short interest. We compute this
variable by summing the short interest for all the NYSE stocks in our
sample for the NYSE regressions and by summing the short interest for
all the NASDAQ stocks in our sample each month.
We are interested in the effects of TRA97 on short selling and on the
predictive power of short-interest announcements and are particularly
interested in short-selling activity in December and January before and
after the implementation of TRA97. We use dummy variables to capture
unique aspects of these time periods. BDEC is a dummy variable that is
set to 1 for data that are in the month of December and before June 8,
1997; otherwise, it is 0. Thus, it captures any temporal effects on short
selling due to Decembers pre TRA97. ADEC is a dummy variable that is
set to 1 for data that are in the month of December and after June 8, 1997;
otherwise, it is 0. BJAN is a dummy variable that is set to 1 for data that
are in the month of January and prior to June 8, 1997; otherwise, it is 0.
AJAN is a dummy variable that is set to 1 for data that are in the month of
January and after June 8, 1997; otherwise, it is 0. By examining the
differences among the coefficients for BDEC, BJAN,ADEC, andAJAN,
we can assess the extent to which market participants’ behavior is con-
sistent with the proposed ‘‘minimum-cost strategy’’ and we can deduce
the impact of TRA97 on short selling against the box.
The independent variables in the following regression control for short
interest determinants and allow us to identify short selling that we believe
to be short selling against the box; we run the following regression on
NYSE stocks and NASDAQ stocks:
Relative short interest ¼ b0 þ b1ðaggregate short interestÞ
þ b2ðstock returnÞ þ b3BDECþ b4BJAN
þ b5ADECþ b6AJANþ b7ðvolumeÞ
þ b8ðBrm sizeÞ þ b9ðoption dummyÞ
þ b10ðmarket index returnÞ
þ b11ðconvertible dummyÞ
þ b12ðmerger dummyÞ þ e: ð1Þ
Table 6 reports the results of regression 1. Aggregate short interest and
dummy variables for options, convertibles, and merger arbitrage are all
positively related to short-selling activity and consistently statistically
significant for both exchanges.
Firms with traded options, convertible securities, or those that an-
nounce acquisition plans have more relative short interest than their
counterparts, ceteris paribus. These differences are likely to be largely
due to hedging and arbitrage activities. More specifically, NYSE firms
with traded options have on average 1.4 percentage points more relative
1324 Journal of Business
#short interest than those without traded options (0.7 percentage points for
NASDAQ firms); NYSE firms with convertible securities have 1.3 per-
centage points more relative short interest than those without conver-
tibles (1.3 percentage points for NASDAQ firms); and NYSE firms with
ongoing merger activity have 1.6 percentage points more relative short
interest than those without (0.8 percentage points for NASDAQ firms).
As a basis for comparison, our NYSE firms have an average relative short
interest of 1.34% and standard deviation of 3.03%, and our NASDAQ
firms have average relative short interest of 1.70% with standard devi-
ation of 3.24%. Thus, options, convertibles, and mergers all have a sub-
stantial impact on relative short interest, and collectively, these findings
highlight the importance of arbitrage and hedging activities on relative
short-interest levels.
Volume and size proxy for the liquidity and availability of the stock;
positive relationships between these variables and short-interest would
be consistent with previous research. We find this for volume, but we
find a negative coefficient on size. Although size and volume are highly
correlated (see table 5), this is not a multicollinearity problem: per-
forming the regression with (1) size only, (2) volume only, and (3) both
volume and size for both NYSE and NASDAQ securities yields similar
results. Rather, the negative coefficient on size in table 6 is a direct and
mechanical result of having relative short interest (which is shares held
short divided by shares outstanding, a measure closely related to size)
on the left-hand side. Reformulating the regression with log of short
interest on the left-hand side, for example, gives the expected signs on
all coefficients (and higher R2). The results are qualitatively very similar
to the results presented here, but we think the coefficients are easier to
interpret as we have presented them, with relative short interest on the
left-hand side.
We examine the differences between BJAN and BDEC and between
ADEC and BDEC to assess whether there was a change in short-selling
activity after the implementation of TRA97. Specifically, if short selling
against the box had been prevalent before TRA97 and uncommon after,
then prior to TRA97, short interest would have been relatively large in
December (as some traders deferred capital gains taxes) and relatively
small in January (as they closed their costly positions), but there would be
essentially no difference betweenDecember and January short selling after
TRA97. Following Dyl (1978), we hypothesize that the following relation
among regression coefficients holds: BJANBDEC < 0. After TRA97,
we anticipate no significant difference between January and December
short interest because the end-of-year tax motivations for opening or clos-
ing short positions is gone. So, we hypothesize that the following relation
among regression coefficients holds: AJAN  ADEC = 0.
Tests for differences among coefficients are reported in panel B of
Table 6. The results are consistent with our expectations. The differences
1325The Information Content of Short Interest: A Natural Experiment
TABLE 6 Determinants of Short Interest
A. Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Relative Short Interest)
NYSE NASDAQ
Intercept .012232 .058445
(2.88***) (16.20***)
Aggregate short interest (1,000) .006671 .003001
(2.60***) (1.87*)
Stock return (YTD from Jan. 1) .004347 .001250
(1.82*) (1.54)
Dummy: December before TRA97 (BDEC) .001216 .000172
(2.16**) (.36)
Dummy: January before TRA97 (BJAN) .002765 .003666
(4.59***) (9.71***)
Dummy: December after TRA97 (ADEC) .001175 .000730
(1.55) (1.40)
Dummy: January after TRA97 (AJAN) .000918 .000209
(1.46) (.43)
Log natural (average daily trading volume) .006577 .006807
(9.55***) (23.43***)
Log natural (market value of equity) .006385 .000394
(8.17***) (1.33)
Dummy: traded options .014255 .007118
(9.87***) (7.51***)
Market return .004414 .004852
(2.09**) (3.48***)
Dummy: convertible securities .013005 .013408
(5.57***) (9.08***)
Dummy: merger arbitrage .016146 .008359
(4.56***) (3.29***)
Adjusted R2 .1647 .1880
F-statistic 510.88*** 1,264.70***
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B. Difference Tests
Coefficients Expected Sign Intuition
NYSE
Difference
(t-Statistic)
NASDAQ
Difference
(t-Statistic)
BJAN–BDEC Negative Before TRA97, short selling against the
box drives up short interest before
turn of the year; traders close positions
in January .00155 .00384
(2.16**) (6.71***)
AJAN–ADEC Zero After TRA97, no tax motivations to short sell,
so no calendar effects expected .00026 .00094
(.35) (1.37)
Note.—Data are monthly observations for 535 NYSE stocks and 1,129 NASDAQ stocks during the period January 1995 through November 1999. The dependent variable is
relative short interest (short interest divided by number of shares outstanding). The independent variables are an intercept, aggregate short interest for all stocks in our sample
divided by 1,000 (NYSE only for the NYSE regressions, NASDAQ only for the NASDAQ regressions), the individual stocks’ tax-year-to-date return up to that month’s short
interest announcement date (i.e., the rate of return from January 1 to the 15th of the month of the short interest announcement), dummy variables to indicate December before
TRA97, December after TRA97, January before TRA97, and January after TRA97, the natural logarithm of 1 plus the average daily volume over the previous month, the log of 1
plus the firm market value, a dummy variable indicating if there are traded options on the stock, the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted index, a dummy variable to
indicate if the company has convertible securities outstanding, and a merger arbitrage dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has announced an acquisition of another
publicly traded firm (we change this to 0 when the target delists). All t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using 12 months of lags (see Newey and
West 1987) and are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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#between Decembers and Januarys in the pre-TRA97 period are about 16
basis points of relative short interest for NYSE stocks in our sample and
about 38 basis points of relative short interest for NASDAQ stocks in our
sample. These differences are statistically different from zero (t-statistics
of 2.17 and 6.71 for NYSE and NASDAQ, respectively). Econom-
ically, this represents about 11.6% (39.2%) of mean (median) short in-
terest on NYSE and 22.5% (81.2%) of mean (median) short interest on
NASDAQ (see tables 3 and 4 for means and medians). These means and
medians are not themselves very large, but our results indicate that short
selling against the box had a significant effect on what short selling there
was prior to TRA97.16
VI. Noise Reduction: Increasing the Predictive Power of Short Interest
This section contains our central findings. Based on our theoretical
results from Section III, our main hypothesis is that TRA97 increased
the bearish information content of short interest in stocks. In addition to
some of the variables defined previously, we employ the following
variables in our regression that examines the information content of
short interest announcements. We use two different model specifica-
tions to differentiate between levels of relative short interest. First, we
use a continuous variable to measure short interest: we use the variables
BSISHR and ASISHR to denote relative short interest before and after
TRA97, respectively.
To allow a less restrictive specification, we also regress returns on
quintile dummy variables.17 These are dummy variables that are set to 1
if an observation for a stock in a given month is in that quintile of relative
short interest (a preceding B denotes being in that quintile in a month that
is before TRA97; a preceding A denotes being in that quintile in a month
that is after TRA97). Otherwise, the variable is set to 0. The variables
BQ5 and AQ5 denote the highest quintile of relative short interest before
and after TRA97, respectively. These variables allow us to examine
whether ‘‘extreme’’ short interest conveys more information than mod-
erate levels of short interest, and they do not impose the constraint that the
effect must be the same in all quintiles.
We report the results of regressions 2 and 3 in table 7:
Future 1-month stock return ¼ b0 þ b1ðsizeÞ
þ b2ðfuture 1-monthmarket returnÞ
þ b3BSISHRþ b4ASISHRþ e; ð2Þ
16. In our sample we have only two Januarys after TRA97, January 1998 and January 1999.
Other things being equal, this tends to reduce the power of the second test in panel B of table 4
(i.e., the one with null that there were no tax-induced calendar effects on short interest after
TRA97). However, our cross section is so large that issues of power should not be a concern.
17. We also test specifications using quartiles and deciles, which yield similar results.
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TABLE 7 Short Interest and Future Return
A. Regression Results (Dependent Variable = 1-Month Future Return)
NYSE NASDAQ
Intercept .0526 .0460 .1149 .1078
(11.32***) (11.22***) (19.72***) (19.25***)
Log normal (market
value of equity)
.0041 .0032 .0103 .0090
(11.17***) (10.59***) (20.88***) (19.69***)
Market index return .7663 .7748 1.2376 1.2406
(49.30***) (49.73***) (62.23***) (62.84***)
Relative short interest
pre TRA97
(BSISHR)
.0616 .2319
(2.11**) (7.61***)
Relative short interest
post TRA97
(ASISHR)
.1390 .1782
(3.34***) (5.40***)
Relative short interest
quintile 2 pre
TRA97 (BQ2)
.0022 .0025
(1.31) (1.02)
Relative short interest
quintile 2 post
TRA97 (AQ2)
.0124 .0105
(6.22***) (3.74***)
Relative short interest
quintile 3 pre
TRA97 (BQ3)
.0003 .0092
(.15) (3.87***)
Relative short interest
quintile 3 post
TRA97 (AQ3)
.0137 .0171
(5.85***) (6.33***)
Relative short interest
quintile 4 pre
TRA97 (BQ4)
.0019 .0181
(.99) (7.17***)
Relative short interest
quintile 4 post
TRA97 (AQ4)
.0136 .0203
(5.54***) (7.06***)
Relative short interest
quintile 5 pre
TRA97 (BQ5)
.0025 .0274
(1.14) (10.72***)
Relative short interest
quintile 5 post
TRA97 (AQ5)
.0168 .0179
(6.38***) (5.78***)
Adjusted R2 .0974 .0944 .0733 .0721
F-statistic 335.7*** 809.2*** 518.1*** 1273.5***
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41.1
#Future 1-month stock return ¼ b0þ b1ðsizeÞ
þ b2ðfuture 1-monthmarket returnÞ
þ b3BQ2þ b4BQ3þ b5BQ4
þ b6BQ5þ b7AQ2þ b8AQ3
þ b9AQ4þ b10AQ5þ e; ð3Þ
where in addition to the previously defined variables, we control
for market movements with the 1-month return on the market (CRSP
value-weighted return contemporaneous with the future stock return).
The dependent variable is the 1-month future return on the stock. We
use two different time frames for calculation of returns. First, we use
the 1-month period from the short interest announcement to the follow-
ing month’s announcement of short interest. The announcement re-
flects the first time that short interest information is readily available to
all market participants. It is possible, however, that some market par-
ticipants might know the short interest information before the public
announcement and be able to trade based on that information; so for
TABLE 7 (Continued )
B. Difference Tests
Coefficients Expected Sign
NYSE
Difference
(t-Statistic)
NASDAQ
Difference
(t-Statistic)
ASISHR – BSISHR Negative .2006 .0537
(4.17***) (1.29)
AQ5 – BQ5 Negative .0143 .0095
(4.98***) (2.85***)
AQ4 – BQ4 Negative .0117 .0023
(4.97***) (.75)
AQ3 – BQ3 Negative .0134 .0079
(5.85***) (2.68***)
AQ2 – BQ2 Negative .0146 .0130
(6.90***) (4.13***)
Wald test statisticy 131.41*** 32.90***
Note.—Data are monthly observations for 535 NYSE and 1,129 NASDAQ stocks during the period
January 1995 through November 1999. The dependent variable is the individual stocks’ 1-month future
return. The independent variables are an intercept, firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity, the market return contemporaneous with the stock’s return as measured by the
1-month return on the CRSP value-weighted index. Returns are alternately calculated based on 1 month
subsequent to the announcement of short interest. Other independent variables are relative short interest
in the stock before or after TRA97, dummy variables indicating if the quintile of relative short interest
for the stock (Quintile 5 is highest short interest) before and after TRA97. All t-statistics are corrected
for heteroscedasticity (see White 1980) and reported in parentheses. The results are robust to auto-
correlation (robustness tests using corrections for autocorrelation with 3-, 6-, and 12-month lags give
virtually identical results to those reported here, and are omitted (see Newey and West 1987). The
results of difference tests among the coefficients and a Wald test for joint significance are reported in
panel B. *, **, ***denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ydenotes a joint test
that all quintile differences are zero.
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#robustness, we also calculate returns based on when short interest is
calculated by the exchanges (the settlement date), which is several days
earlier (4 days for NYSE, 8 days for NASDAQ). The results are qual-
itatively very similar, so we report only those results based on the news
release dates.
We test for statistical differences between coefficients to determine if
the informational content of short interest has increased. Specifically, we
test for differences between the regression coefficients on the following
variables: ASISHR and BSISHR, AQ2 and BQ2, AQ3 and BQ3, AQ4
andBQ4, andAQ5 andBQ5.18Our extension toDiamond andVerrecchia’s
model implies that the informativeness of short interest should increase
with the exit of tax-deferring short sellers against the box. Therefore, we
expect the coefficients of the quintile variables and continuous short
interest variable to become more negative after TRA97, making the ex-
pected sign on all of our difference tests negative.
The results of these regressions are in table 7, panels A and B. Prior to
TRA97, high levels of short interest (represented by BQ5) have a sig-
nificantly negative relationship with future returns for NASDAQ stocks
and an insignificantly negative relationship with future returns for NYSE
stocks. Lower levels (represented by BQ2) have an insignificantly posi-
tive relationship with returns. This relationship is consistent with Asquith
andMeulbroek (1995), short interest is bearish in the most heavily shorted
stocks.
The most important information from our regressions, though, is not
the values of the coefficients themselves but the differences in coefficient
values. Panel B of table 7 reports the results of difference tests among our
temporal dummy variables and continuous measures of levels of relative
short interest. For the NYSE stocks, short-interest announcements con-
vey significantly more negative information after TRA97. Difference tests
for our quintile dummy variables and our relative short-interest variable
are negative, as expected, and statistically significant for both news release
date and settlement date returns. The differences for the dummy variables
are of a magnitude of about negative 1.3% on average. Our Wald test sta-
tistic strongly rejects that the differences of the coefficients are jointly zero.
After TRA97, short-interest announcements thus convey substantiallymore
negative information for NYSE stocks.
The results differ for NASDAQ stocks. Short interest conveys con-
siderably more negative information for heavily shorted NASDAQ
stocks than heavily shortedNYSE stocks before TRA97. Short interest in
18. Although not reported, we examined the robustness of our results to using other
measures of short interest: short interest divided by average daily trading volume, log of short
interest, change in relative short interest, and percent change in short interest all provide
qualitatively similar results.
1331The Information Content of Short Interest: A Natural Experiment
#the top quintile of NASDAQ short interest is higher than the short interest
in the corresponding NYSE quintile. If a high level of negative infor-
mation leads to only a small marginal impact of an increase in costs, then
we should not expect TRA97 to have as much impact on our NASDAQ
stocks. Empirically, we find that, for our relative short-interest variable
and the two highest quintiles of relative short interest, the differences in
coefficients in our NASDAQ regressions do not support our hypothe-
sis that the information content of short interest increases after TRA97.
The differences are positive (and significant for the most heavily shorted
stocks) or only weakly negative. However, evidence frommoremoderate
levels of relative short interest (Quintiles 2 and 3) do support Diamond
and Verrecchia’s model—the differences are negative and statistically
significant. We suggest a possible explanation for this NASDAQ result.
NASDAQ underwent substantial market reforms throughout 1997.
Due to these reforms, dealers faced increased competition from limit
orders and electronic communication networks (ECNs). These reforms
dramatically decreased trading costs on theNASDAQ (seeWeston 2000).
Decreases in trading costs make trading more attractive for uninformed
traders, and an influx of uninformed traders in response to the market re-
forms may have more than offset the noise-reducing effects that TRA97
had on the information content of short interest. In addition to the sig-
nificant structural shifts around the time of TRA97 (see Weston 2000),
during our sample period, there was an increase in electronic trading and
day trading, much of it focused on NASDAQ stocks (see Garvey 2001).
Many of these day traders were found to be short sellingwithout regard to
the usual restrictions and costs associated with short selling (see Arnold
and Butler 2003). In addition to the structural changes and the changes
in the composition of traders, during the ‘‘tech bubble,’’ the NASDAQ
index posted unusually high annual returns of approximately 40% in
1998 and over 80% in 1999. Collectively, these changes in the NASDAQ
market during our sample period mean that our NASDAQ results must
be interpreted with caution.
VII. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
As indicated in figure 3, short selling increased over the period 1995–
98. Short selling against the box dropped off dramatically following the
implementation of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, however. With the
absence of investors selling short against the box, the informativeness
and predictive ability of short interest materially increased. This pro-
vides strong support for the predictions of Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987).
These conclusions are important: the exit from the market of tax-
driven, uninformed short sales against the box means that the remaining
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#short positions convey more information than before the Tax Relief Act
of 1997. That is, short sales are now more likely to be informative due to
the ‘‘noise reduction’’ of eliminating uninformed, tax-motivated short
selling against the box.
Whereas we focus on only one facet of the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 (increased cost of short selling), the act also changed capital gains
tax rates, eliminated tax deferring benefits to synthetic option positions
(including some collars), and changed the holding periods for long-
versus short-term gains. Thus, TRA97 might provide a useful laboratory
for researchers studying other financial phenomena.
Appendix
This appendix derives and proves our two main theoretical results. Using our ex-
tended version of the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model, we calculate the
proportion of informed short selling by dividing the probability of informed short
selling by the probability of short selling.
From the game tree, the probability of uninformed short selling is
1
2
gð1 aÞ½hqðc1 þ c2Þ þ ð1 hÞc1; ðA1Þ
and the probability of informed short selling is
1
2
gaðc1 þ c2Þ½ð1 hÞ þ hq: ðA2Þ
We can determine the proportion of informed short selling by dividing equation (A1)
by the sum of equations (A1) and (A2). Thus, the proportion of informed short
selling is
aðc1 þ c2Þ
ðc1 þ ac2Þ
ð1 hÞ þ hq
ð1 hÞ þ hq c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
 
8<
:
9=
;: ðA3Þ
We now derive our main theoretical results.
Proposition 1. As the probability of short selling against the box, q, decreases,
the proportion of informed short selling increases.
Proof. First, note that, because 0 < a < 1; ðc1 þ c2Þ=ðc1 þ ac2Þ > 1. Now, it is
easy to see that the partial derivative of equation (A3) with respect to q is negative:
aðc1 þ c2Þ
ðc1 þ ac2Þ
hð1 hÞ 1 c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
  
ð1 hÞ þ hq c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
  2
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
< 0 ðA4Þ
Q.E.D.
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#Corollary to Proposition 1. If q is zero, the proportion of informed short sell-
ing is greater than if q is strictly positive.
Proof. We first establish the following result.
Lemma. Equation (A3) is less than aðc1 þ c2Þ=ðc1 þ ac2Þ.
Proof. Assume 0  a < 1; that is, not all traders are informed, c1> 0, and
c2 > 0. Then,
c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
 
> 1: ðA5Þ
Therefore,
ð1 hÞ þ hq c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
 
> ð1 hÞ þ hq: ðA6Þ
Therefore,
1 hð Þ þ hq
1 hð Þ þ hq c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
 
2
4
3
5<1: ðA7Þ
Therefore,
aðc1 þ c2Þ
ðc1 þ ac2Þ
1 hð Þ þ hq
1 hð Þ þ hq c1 þ c2
c1 þ ac2
 
2
4
3
5< aðc1 þ c2Þðc1 þ ac2Þ : ðA8Þ
Q.E.D.
We now prove the corollary by setting q = 0 in equation (A3). Equation (A3)
collapses to
aðc1 þ c2Þ
ðc1 þ ac2Þ : ðA9Þ
Hence, by the lemma, the corollary is true.
Q.E.D.
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